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Abstract:  
A simple game-theoretic model is first presented to bring out the conditions for terrorist 
organizations to choose to perpetrate their attacks in a host country other than at home. This 
emphasizes the diluted impact of counter-terrorism measures implemented in the host-country 
on the number of attacks taking place there. These measures might attract more imported 
attacks and mainly impact the number of attacks exported by the domestic terrorists without 
affecting much the overall level of terrorist activity in the host country. The empirical results 
presented provide some support to this prediction, by contrasting the econometric equations 
that explain the number of attacks per country of origin vs. per host country. A dyadic 
analysis is also presented. These analyses confirm the role of foreign aid as a counterterrorism 
measure in the source country, but it raises the issue of its role in the host country. Although 
foreign aid is confirmed as an effective tool for reducing the total number of attacks produced, 
it affects the venue of these terrorist attacks. Military interventions are mostly counter-
productive, as they seem to be a strong attraction factor for terrorists. 
 
Keywords : Foreign Aid, Terrorism, Military Intervention, Education 
 
 
Acknowledgments: This paper has been presented in seminars at Universidad del Pais Vasco 
in Bilbao, CERDI (Clermont-Ferrand), GATE (Lyon), ERUDITE (Marne la Vallée) and at 
the European Public Choice Society (EPCS) in Rennes and the ASSA Meeting in Chicago. 
Helpful comments by participants and in particular by Raul Caruso, Walter Enders, who was 
the discussant at ASSA, Javier Gardeazabal, Martin Gassebner, who was the discussant at 
EPCS, Carlos Seiglie and Kerry Smith are gratefully acknowledged, without implicating. 
 
 1
1. Introduction 
 The first decade of the 21st century has witnessed a major change in international 
relations, with the fight against terrorism becoming the dominant issue. At the same time, 
developed nations have massively stepped up their disbursement of foreign aid to poor 
countries, as shown in figure 1. Some authors have pointed out that the post 9/11 aid boom is 
likely to be directly related to the perceived increase in the terrorist threat.  
 
Figure 1: Foreign Aid and Number of Terrorist Attacks, 1990-2007 
Lancaster (2008) documents the changes in the US government’s attitude towards 
foreign aid that took place under the Bush administration. The latter created the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation to handle the increased flow of resources transferred to developing 
countries selected for their reliable positions in the global war on terror. Fleck and Kilby 
(2010) provide a thorough quantitative analysis of these changes, showing that the US aid 
budget has significantly gone up under the Bush administration. In fact, the West seems to be 
reviving the tradition prevailing during the cold war when foreign aid was granted more or 
less explicitly with a view to induce political alignment in recipient countries. Frey (1984) 
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provides a classic analysis of this issue, showing that the allocation of foreign aid flows across 
recipient countries was largely determined by the alignment with the two super powers of the 
time. Alesina and Dollar (2000) have shown econometrically that this kind of political 
alignment was still highly significant for explaining the allocation of foreign aid across 
recipient countries. 
 However, while this literature has shown convincingly that foreign aid is significantly 
determined by the pursuit of international political objectives, it has only partially addressed 
the issue of what goals are the rich countries trying to achieve by this means. While the list of 
potential objectives is still open, this line of research has already produced a few clues. The 
attention of the profession was first attracted by the so-called “aid-ineffectiveness” literature, 
originating in Boone (1996) and in Burnside and Dollar (2000), which has brought out the 
fairly negative diagnosis that aid is not really targeted at reducing poverty and boosting 
growth in recipient countries. Another fairly negative result was brought out by Alesina and 
Weder (2002), showing that foreign aid has a tendency to increase corruption in recipient 
countries, through the “voracity effect”, while this does not seem to bother donors at all. 
Beside these negative results, some more positive results about the donors’ true motivations 
have been brought out in the literature. Using a two-stage method with a view to tease out 
causality, Azam and Berlinschi (2010) have shown that (i) foreign aid reduces the inflow of 
immigrants from low-income and lower-middle income countries into donor countries, and 
(ii) the donors are actually using aid as a tool to abate this inflow.  
 Using a similar two-stage approach, Azam and Delacroix (2006) and Azam and 
Thelen (2008, 2010) have shown empirically that rich countries are allocating foreign aid 
across recipient countries with a view to abate terrorism, and that they are achieving a 
significant impact on the number of terrorist attacks produced by recipient countries.  Their 
econometric approach is based on a structural model where the fight against terrorism is 
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delegated to the aid-recipient governments. Foreign aid is then viewed as a payment delivered 
by the donors in return for the efforts invested by the recipient governments in fighting 
terrorism within their sphere of influence. They use two different datasets spanning 1990-
2004 to estimate a structural equation explaining the number of transnational terrorist attacks 
produced by the different countries, while controlling for the endogeneity of some of the 
explanatory variables. Two robust results come out of their different cross-country estimates, 
namely that countries receiving more foreign aid and countries better endowed in educational 
capital tend to produce significantly less terrorist attacks than the others. Using different 
approaches, Dreher and Fuchs (2011) have analyzed the increase in foreign aid observed 
during the war on terror period (2002-2008), and illustrated at figure 1. A first analysis of 22 
donor countries suggests that the aid effort increased during this period but not as a response 
to terrorism. Disaggregating their analysis, they have shown that countries from which 
terrorism originates are not more likely to receive aid but they receive a larger amount of aid 
if they are selected. They also found differences in how donor countries react to terrorism by 
examining particular donor countries. France, Italy and Sweden decreased aid to countries 
from which terrorism is likely to originate as a consequence of terrorist attacks while the 
United States increased the amounts of aid. The present paper is also related to the work of 
Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas (2011a). They present a two-stage game of strategic 
interaction between the counter-terrorism measures of the donor country and the recipient 
country. Foreign counter-terrorism measures using foreign aid for fighting terrorism at the 
source and thus originating from the recipient country may be complementary to the donor 
defensive counter-terrorism measures. For weak state with unstable regime, they show that 
untied aid may be more effective than conditional aid. However, the analyses of the number 
of terrorist attacks that a country is hosting suggest that the amount of foreign aid received has 
no significant impact. Campos and Gassebner (2009) find no strong links between foreign aid 
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and the number of attacks and fatalities caused by these attacks in the host country. There is 
also some evidence that aid given to specific sectors have different impacts. According to the 
empirical results of Young and Findley (2011), foreign aid decreases terrorism especially 
when it is given to improve education, health, civil society and conflict prevention. 
Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas (2011b) have also shown that foreign aid might 
mitigate the negative effects of terrorism on foreign direct investment, especially the impact 
of total and domestic terrorism while this is not the case for transnational terrorism. 
   Azam and Thelen (2010) get a more ambiguous result regarding the impact of military 
interventions on the number of terrorist attacks by country of origin. Whether the country 
hosting the US soldiers is an oil exporter or not seems to be an important determinant of the 
impact of the presence of these soldiers on the production of terrorist attacks by the host 
country. However, the estimated impact depends on the dataset used, so that no firm 
conclusion about this point can be extracted from this econometric analysis. This work is also 
related to the analysis of Braithwaite (2010) showing that countries deploying more troops are 
more likely to experience transnational terrorist attacks against their interests and the 
deployment of foreign military troops generates negative externalities. Bapat (2011) finds that 
military aid creates a moral hazard problem and might not be effective in the fight against 
terrorist organizations. However military aid can prevent host governments from negotiating 
with them. Like Azam and Thelen (2010), we consider in this paper foreign aid and military 
intervention as the main counter-terrorism measures that a foreign country might use to 
protect its economic or political interests abroad.  
 The aim of the present paper is to go deeper into the analysis of the impacts of foreign 
aid, educational capital, and US military presence on the production and export of terrorist 
attacks, in order to clarify their policy implications. It first confirms empirically the 
effectiveness of foreign aid as a means to reduce the number of terrorist attacks produced by 
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source countries using the ITERATE data set over the 1990-2007 period. However, terrorist 
organizations can perpetrate their attacks in third countries, so that the actual number of 
terrorist attacks taking place in any given country might differ significantly from the number 
that is produced by the latter’s own terrorist organizations. Host countries might in fact import 
a lot of attacks from abroad, while some source countries might export a large share of the 
attacks they produce to some other venues. The present paper provides a simple game-
theoretic analysis of this phenomenon, in order to bring out how these exports and imports of 
terrorist attacks may disconnect the number of terrorist attacks hosted by a country from its 
own efforts to counter terrorism. This theoretical analysis helps us to understand the kind of 
cross-border externalities entailed by each country’s fight against terrorism.  
 The paper then presents an empirical analysis confirming the contrast between the 
determinants of the number of terrorist attacks produced by a country and the number that the 
latter is hosting. This empirical analysis is first performed at the cross-country level, in order 
to bring out this disconnection effect by contrasting the findings using the number of attacks 
by host country and by source country. However, this raises a potential omitted variable 
problem, because the export and import flows of terrorist attacks across countries create links 
between the counter-terrorism measures adopted in one country and the number of attacks 
taking place in some other countries. In order to take this issue into account, we then use 
dyadic data to analyze imported terrorist attacks. This dyadic analysis confirms the role of 
foreign aid as a counter-terrorism measure in the source country, but it raises the issue of its 
role as an attraction factor in the host country. This finding suggests that there are severe 
incentive problems regarding the role of foreign aid in the war on terror. Although foreign aid 
is confirmed as an effective tool for reducing the total number of attacks produced, it affects 
the venue of these terrorist attacks in a counter-productive way. Hence, these findings raise 
some doubt about the so-called “hearts and minds” approach used recently in Iraq by the US-
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led intervention force, which aims at using foreign aid locally with a view to undermine the 
possible popular support that the terrorists might get and thus reduce the number of attacks 
occurring there. Picard and Buss (2009) claim that this approach was already used by the 
Kennedy administration in Vietnam. Lastly, the present analysis is adding a bit of uncertainty 
to the debate regarding the impact of military interventions in the war on terror, by suggesting 
that they are mostly counter-productive, as they seem to be a strong attraction factor for 
terrorists, while they do not affect the number of attacks produced by source countries in a 
very significant fashion. However, their impact on imported attacks does not seem robust, 
suggesting that they mostly work by reducing the number of attacks exported by the countries 
that host these interventions. 
The next section presents the theoretical discussion, while section 3 below presents the 
empirical results, the cross-country analysis and the dyadic analysis. 
 
2. A Two-Country Model of Exporting and Importing Terrorist Attacks 
 We analyze a world where a major power has some political or economic interests 
represented in two other countries. Each of the latter is harboring a terrorist organization that 
seeks to attack the foreign power’s economic or political interests in any of these two 
countries. Hence, the terrorist organizations have the choice of perpetrating these attacks 
either at home, or abroad, or fanning out in both. We assume away the possibility of attacking 
the foreign power on the latter’s own territory, where the strategy to counter terrorism raises 
some additional issues beyond the ones analyzed here.  
 The Terrorist Organizations 
 Define 0sha ≥  as the number of attacks against the foreign power perpetrated by the 
terrorist organization from the source country { }1, 2s∈  in the host country { }1, 2h∈  and 
2
1
h sh
s
A a
=
= ∑ as the total number of attacks hitting the foreign power’s interests in country h , 
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whatever the origin of their authors. Define also 0δ >  as the relative cost of perpetrating an 
attack abroad rather than at home. In what follows we will typically assume that 1δ <  in 
order to capture the fact that the counter-terrorist units of the police or the army in the host 
country will probably inflict less damage to the terrorist organization and its supporters in the 
source country than the latter’s own country’s equivalent units would in case of home attacks. 
In the latter case, the counter-terrorist units’ response might include a crackdown on 
suspected terrorists and their supporters, as well as some increased police pressure that might 
disrupt their future operations. Moreover, the host-country’s counter-terrorist units are 
generally less well prepared to track foreign terrorists acting outside their own country, who 
just spend little time in the host country for preparing their attack. They might be taken by 
surprise by the attack, after having failed to detect these terrorists at the border when they 
entered the country. Similarly, the local counter-terrorist units might fail to get enough 
intelligence from the terrorists’ country of origin, if only because the latter might have a hard 
time tracking them along the indirect route that terrorists generally use to get to their theatre 
of operation. Hence the source-country anti-terrorist units might not know where the terrorists 
have moved to. By contrast, their home country’s police would have an advantage for 
tracking all their moves within their home country, after years of surveillance within a well 
known territory. In particular, they would be in a position to monitor more closely the various 
kinds of support that terrorists get in their own country, and might have some informants 
infiltrated among them. For the sake of saving notation, define also 
2
1
s h
s sh
h
C aδ −
=
=∑  as the 
total number of attacks perpetrated by country s ’s terrorists weighted by their relative cost. 
 Assume that each country’s terrorist organization values equally the attacks 
perpetrated by the other country’s terrorists against the same target in the same host country 
as its own attacks. We thus assume that there is a public-good (“public-bad”) dimension to 
terrorism, as each country’s terrorists would derive satisfaction from all the attacks 
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perpetrated by all the terrorist organizations within each country, independently of their 
national origin. Hence, there is an interaction between the two terrorist organizations via this 
mechanism that calls for a game-theoretic analysis. We use the simplest simultaneous-move 
Nash equilibrium concept for solving the model. Then, assuming for the sake of simplicity a 
quadratic specification for the cost function, each terrorist organization seeks to maximize the 
following expression, taking as given the equilibrium choice made by the other one: 
 ( )2 2
1
max 2
sh
s h h s sa h
V v A Cθ γ
=
= −∑ .      (1) 
 In this expression, { }0, 1, 2h hθ ≥ ∈  captures the “attractiveness” of the host country 
for the terrorists, which plausibly depends both on the strategic value of the foreign power’s 
interests present in that country and on the links between the local government and this 
foreign power. Then, the function ( )hv A  is assumed increasing and concave, in order to 
capture the additional benefits that the terrorists get when the foreign power is hit in different 
countries, putting the latter under a multi-country pressure forcing it to spread its self-
protection efforts more thinly. The source-country-specific parameter 0sγ >  is a portmanteau 
parameter that captures both the effectiveness of all the counter-terrorist measures taken by 
the government in the source country, which increase sγ , and the extent of the popular 
support that the terrorist organization enjoys in its own country, reducing sγ . We take all 
these source-country-specific influences on the terrorist organization’s cost of operation as 
exogenous in this partial-equilibrium analysis. The amounts of foreign aid received by the 
source-country’s government and the level of secondary school enrollment have been found 
highly significant inhibitors of terrorist violence by Azam and Thelen (2008, 2010). These 
two determinants may be viewed as some background determinants of a high sγ , which we 
take into account in the empirical analysis below. 
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Patterns of Specialization 
 This simple model allows us to discuss various patterns of specialization by the two 
terrorist organizations, which are fanning out if they are active in both countries or focusing, 
if they only launch their attacks in one country. This simple framework can generate all types 
of patterns of specialization for different configurations of parameters. However, rather than 
providing a catalog of all possible cases, we only focus here on some more relevant cases. 
The following proposition first clears the ground by spelling out a simple condition that 
excludes three impossible cases. 
 
Proposition 1: If 0 1δ< <  it is impossible for the two countries’ terrorist organizations to be 
both engaged in home attacks in equilibrium. 
Proof: Define 0shλ ≥  as the Lagrange multiplier attached to the non-negativity constraint 
0sha ≥ , with complementary slackness. Then, the first-order condition for problem (1) may 
be written as: 
 ( ) { } { }' , 1, 2 , 1, 2s hh h s s shv A C s hθ δ γ λ−= − ∈ ∈ .    (2) 
 Then it is easily checked that it is impossible to have: 
 { } { }0, 1, 2 , 1, 2sh s hλ = ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ .      (3) 
 This would imply: 
 ( ) { } { } { }' , 1, 2 , 1, 2 , 1, 2s h s hh h s s s sv A C C s s s hθ δ γ δ γ− −/ / /= = ∀ ∈ ∀ ≠ ∈ ∀ ∈/ , (4) 
which is clearly impossible if 1δ ≠ . 
 Moreover, it is also easily checked that we necessarily have at least one of the home 
attacks equal to zero so that 0ssλ >  for that one. 
 Proposition 1 thus shows how important is the assumption presented above that the 
relative cost of perpetrating terrorist attacks abroad rather than at home is lower than 1. It 
rules out the following three types of cases: (i) both countries’ terrorist organizations are 
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fanning out, (ii) one of the countries is fanning out and the other one focuses on home attacks, 
and (iii) the two countries specialize in home attacks. It thus entails that at least one of the two 
countries will export some terrorist attacks to the other one and that at most one will 
perpetrate home attacks. This assumption is thus yielding a kind of premium on the export of 
terrorist attacks, and we now focus on the cases where at least one of the terrorist 
organizations is perpetrating its attacks abroad and at most one will launch any home attacks. 
This captures the intuition that, because of the assumed export premium, a terrorist 
organization will only engage in home attacks if its country does not import enough attacks 
from the other one, leaving the marginal value of the home attacks high enough to 
compensate for the higher cost of perpetrating them. This assumption is required in particular 
to allow for the phenomenon of attacks swapping, whereby terrorists from two different 
countries are perpetrating their attacks in each other’s country, a phenomenon that can be 
observed in the real world. If 1δ > , then it is easily checked that at least one country 
specializes in home attacks in equilibrium and we rule this out. Without loss of generality, we 
assume 22 0a = , so that country 1 is really our host-country of interest while country 2 is put 
in the role of the rest of the world that may or may not produce some attacks in country 1. 
Proposition 1 still leaves us with several distinct types of equilibrium configurations of 
attacks, which involve potentially three basic patterns of attack combinations. 
 
Figure 2: Basic Patterns of Attacks 
 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1       2                 1       2                 1       2                 1       2 
  Converging         Swapping          Fanning Out       Composite 
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Figure 2 represents the direction of attack by an arrow flowing from the source 
country to the host country. (i) In the “converging” configuration, the terrorist organizations 
from both source countries perform their attacks in the same host country. (ii) In the 
“swapping” configuration, both terrorist organizations export their attacks to the other 
country, and do not perform any at home. (iii) In the “fanning out” pattern, one country’s 
terrorist organization is attacking in both countries, while the other one refrains from 
performing any attack. Then, (iv) the “composite” configuration is defined as the combination 
of all three basic patterns. 
We now take the composite equilibrium as our reference and spell out the conditions 
for its existence. Then, we show below that the converging equilibrium and the swapping 
equilibrium can be derived from the composite equilibrium under some parameter restrictions, 
while a pure fanning out equilibrium is not possible. In the converging equilibrium, one 
country specializes in home attacks, while the other one specializes in exporting attacks to the 
other country. It follows that one country gets all the attacks while the other one remains free 
from terrorist violence. In the swapping equilibrium, each country exports some attacks to the 
other one, while none of them remains diversified. The conditions for these types of 
equilibriums to prevail are spelt out in proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2:   
(i) A composite equilibrium with 11 12 21 220, 0,  0 and 0a a a a> > > =  exists if: 
 ( )1 1 1 1 2 2'v A C Cθ γ δ γ= = ,       (4) 
and 
 ( )2 2 1 1 2 2'v A C Cθ δ γ γ= < .       (5) 
 (ii) Assume in addition that ( ) { }' 0 , 1, 2h v hθ ∞ ∈ . Then, a converging equilibrium 
with 11 21 12 220, 0,  and 0a a a a> > = =  prevails if (4) holds and: 
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 ( )2 1 1 2 2' 0v C Cθ δ γ γ< < .       (6) 
 (iii) A swapping equilibrium with 12 21 11 220,  0 and 0a a a a> > = =  prevails if (5) holds 
and (4) is replaced by: 
 ( )1 1 2 2 1 1'v A C Cθ δ γ γ= < .       (7) 
 (iv) A fanning out equilibrium with 11 12 21 220, 0,  and  0a a a a> > = =  is not possible. 
Proof: Using again (2), one can easily check the various results in proposition 2 by looking at 
the corresponding combinations of Lagrange multiplier values entailed by complementary 
slackness. 
Figure 3: The Composite Equilibrium 
 
Figure 3 represents the composite equilibrium in a “back-to-back” diagram that allows 
us to give a kind of “demand-and-supply” interpretation of the terrorist organizations 
behavior. In this case, the configuration of parameter values is such that there is an “excess 
demand” for terrorist attacks in host country 1, so that the local terrorists have to perpetrate 
some home attacks in order to put up with an insufficient level of imported attacks, despite 
the additional cost implied by these home attacks relative to exported ones. Figure 3 shows 
intuitively that such a pattern of attacks will prevail when country 1 is a more “attractive” host 
country than country 2 for the terrorists, while the marginal cost of running a terrorist 
1 11 21A a a= +  
11a  
3
2 21aδ γ  
21a  
1 1Cδ γ  
12a  
( )2 ' 0vθ  
11a δ  
1 12 11C a aδ δ= +  
( )2 12'v aθ  
( )1 1'v Aδ θ  
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organization in the latter country is relatively high compared to the corresponding cost in 
country 1. 
Figure 4: The Converging Equilibrium 
 
Figure 4 represents a converging equilibrium, which is derived from the composite 
equilibrium of figure 2 by either lowering the attractiveness parameter 2θ  of country 2 as a 
host country or by increasing the cost parameters 1 2and γ γ . In this case, country 1 is so much 
more attractive as a host country than country 2 that both terrorist organizations give up the 
latter and only focus their activity on attacking the foreign power in country 1. Now, let us go 
beyond the partial-equilibrium setting of this model for a moment and assume that the host 
country’s government gets some negative fallout from the terrorist attacks, e.g., reduced 
foreign investment. Then, it is easy to guess that this kind of equilibrium is providing some 
welcome incentives for each government to reduce its country’s attractiveness as a host for 
terrorist attacks, with a view to divert the attacks produced by its own terrorist organizations 
to the other country.  
At the other extreme, the two countries may be much closer in terms of attractiveness 
as host countries for the terrorist attacks so that the export premium entailed by 1δ <  plays 
the key role. Figure 5 represents the resulting swapping equilibrium, where both terrorist 
organizations specialize in exporting attacks. As a result, the number of attacks hitting the 
foreign power in each host country is independent of the efforts engaged in each of them to 
1 11 21A a a= +  
11a  
3
2 21aδ γ  
21a  
1 1Cδ γ  
( )2 ' 0vθ  
11a δ  
1C δ  
( )2 12'v aθ  
( )1 1'v Aδ θ  
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counter terrorism. Going again beyond the partial equilibrium setting, as we did above, it is 
easy to guess that this configuration is the worst in terms of incentives for national 
governments to engage resources in counter-terrorism activities, whose potential benefits only 
accrue to the other country. A race to the bottom is likely in this case unless the two countries 
engage in a close cooperation for protecting each other’s interests. However, monitoring 
problems related to each country’s sovereignty are bound to crop up in this case. 
Figure 5: The Swapping Equilibrium 
 
Comparing these three diagrams shows that the swapping and the converging 
equilibriums can be understood as special cases of the composite one. Figure 6 depicts the 
relative locations of these special cases in the { }1 1,θ γ  space, given { }2 2, ,δ θ γ . This diagram 
emphasizes how the swapping and the converging equilibriums can be understood as 
borderline cases compared with the central case of the composite equilibrium, prevailing for 
rather extreme values of some of the parameters. It brings out that the converging equilibrium 
prevails when both country 1’s attractiveness as a venue for terrorist attacks and the cost or 
running a terrorist organization there are too high and that a swapping equilibrium is 
impossible if the latter cost is too low. Equivalently, it shows that, within the range of values 
for 1θ  that permits the swapping equilibrium to exist, then increasing 1γ  will reach a limit 
1 21A a=  
3
2 21aδ γ  
21a  
1 1Cδ γ  
12a  
( )2 ' 0vθ  
1C δ  
( )2 12'v aθ  ( )1 1'v Aδ θ  
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beyond which it effectiveness as a counter-terrorism device vanishes. Similar diagrams can 
easily be derived in the other parameter subspaces.  
 
Figure 6: Equilibrium Types in the { }1 1,θ γ  Space 
 
In each case involved in proposition 2, we can now characterize the determinants of 
the numbers of attacks occurring in each country as in proposition 3. These predictions form 
the basis of the empirical analysis presented below. 
Proposition 3: The impacts of the exogenous parameters { } { } { }, , 1, 2 , 1, 2h s h sθ γ ∈ ∈  depend 
on the prevailing equilibrium type as described in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Comparative Statics by Equilibrium Type 
Eq. Type hA  1θ  2θ  1γ  2γ  
1A  + 0 0 - Swapping 
2A  0 + - 0 
1A  + - - - Composite 
2A  - + - - 
1A  + 0 - - Converging  
2A  0 0 0 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Composite 
Swapping 
Converging 
1γ  
1θ  
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Proof: The signs of these impacts can either be found by shifting the different curves at figure 
3 through 5 or by tedious calculations from the equilibrium conditions given at proposition 2, 
which are sketched in the appendix. 
 Proposition 3 gives us the main empirical predictions to be tested below. It tells us that 
the number of attacks hosted by a country depends mainly on its own “attractiveness” for 
terrorists, which affects this number positively whenever it is hit at all by terrorist attacks. In 
the composite equilibrium, where some form of competition exists between the host countries, 
it also depends negatively on the other country’s attractiveness. In all three equilibrium 
configurations, it also depends negatively on the cost of running a terrorist organization in the 
country of origin. Lastly, in the cases of the converging and the composite equilibriums, there 
is also a negative effect of the cost of launching the home attack in the host country, an 
impact that disappears in the swapping equilibrium.  
The Diluted Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Hosted Attacks 
Figures 3 through 5 give us an important insight about the impact of the operating cost 
of running a terrorist organization inside the host country on the number of attacks affecting 
the latter. They show that an increase in 1γ , rotating upwards the marginal cost line in the left-
hand panel, provides an incentive for reducing both types of attacks originating in country 1. 
This captures the impact of counter-terrorism measures on the number of attacks per country 
of origin, which have been brought out empirically by Azam and Thelen (2008, 2010), like 
foreign aid or an expanded educational capital.  
However, the impact of this contraction will only translate into a reduction in the 
number of attacks hosted by country 1 in a much diluted way. Two offsetting effects are 
involved, resulting respectively from an imported-attacks expansion and an exported-attacks 
contraction. In both figures 3 and 4, the resulting contraction in the number of home attacks in 
country 1 is partly offset by an increase in the number of imported attacks, responding to the 
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entailed increase in the marginal value of attacks perpetrated there. In both figures 3 and 5, 
the response to the counter-terrorism measures translates into a fall in the number of exported 
attacks, with a dampened effect on the number of home attacks in figure 3.  In figure 5, this 
dampening effect is absent as there are no active home attacks. These two offsetting effects, 
which are only present jointly in the composite equilibrium, constitute the main insight 
brought out by this model. The empirical results presented below suggest that this offsetting 
effect, brought about either by import expansion or export contraction, or both, is highly 
significant. 
 A little imagination is required to extrapolate these predictions from this simple two-
country model to the real world where many countries are unaffected by terrorist activity, on 
the one hand, while many other countries are exporting and/or importing terrorist attacks, on 
the other hand. Our empirical analysis below focuses on the different determinants of the 
number of attacks per host country compared with those of the number of attacks per source 
country. In line with the theoretical framework presented above, they focus on the 
determinants of the level of the host country’s attractiveness to terrorists and on the diluted 
impact of counter-terrorism variables. Our findings provide some qualified support to the 
view that the number of US soldiers present in the host country is the most noticeable 
attraction factor, contrary to some stronger views presented among others by Pape (2006). We 
also analyze the number of attacks per country of origin, in order to identify the counter-
terrorism variables that are subsumed in this theoretical model in the cost parameter. In fact, 
this part of the analysis mainly confirms the findings presented in Azam and Thelen (2010), 
which emphasize foreign aid and educational capital in the source country as the main 
inhibitors of terrorist attacks, although the sample used here is slightly different. This helps us 
to interpret some of the estimates found in the host-country equation.  
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The main prediction flowing from the foregoing theoretical exercise is that the impact 
of the counter-terrorist measures implemented in the host country should not be very robust, 
being probably either swamped at the margin by the imported attacks that are only affected by 
them indirectly, or being mainly vented by reduced exports. In particular, they should not 
come out significantly if the swapping pattern played an important part in the observed 
outcome. Because the host country might import terrorist attacks from several source 
countries, the impact of the counter-terrorism measures implemented in the source countries 
are difficult to capture. Nevertheless, the foregoing theoretical model predicts that they should 
be significant determinants of the number of attacks imported by the host country. We present 
two different attempts at controlling for them. 
3. Econometric Analysis 
 
In this section, we want to identify the determinants of the level of the host country’s 
attractiveness and the impact of the counter-terrorism variables analyzed by Azam and Thelen 
(2010), i.e. the impacts of foreign aid, educational capital and military intervention. We want 
to analyze the different determinants of the number of terrorist attacks per host country and 
compare them to those of the number of attacks per country of origin of the perpetrators. The 
theoretical model suggests that more attractive countries host more attacks, while foreign aid 
and the level of educational capital might have a strong impact as counter-terrorism measures 
only in the terrorists’ country of origin. In the cross-country analysis, we use the same 
econometric method as in Azam and Thelen (2008, 2010). A dyadic analysis of imported 
attacks is also performed below to control for the potential problem of omitted variables that 
could be due to the link between the counter-terrorism measures adopted in one country and 
the number of attacks taking place in other countries. 
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3.1 The Data  
 
Dependent Variables 
The two dependent variables in the cross-country analysis are the number of terrorist 
events per source country and the number of terrorist events per host country taking place 
over the period 1990 to 2007.  
The only dataset available to have the information about the country of origin of the 
perpetrators is ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, Mickolus 
et al., 2008). ITERATE focuses on transnational terrorist attacks where terrorism is defined as 
“the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes by 
any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental 
authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target 
group wider than the immediate victims”, as explained in Enders and Sandler (2000, 2012). 
These data record key information about the date of the attacks, the location of the attacks, the 
type of incidents and, for many events, the country of origin of the perpetrators. Over the 
period 1990 to 2007, the percentage of incidents for which the dataset ITERATE does not 
give the nationality of the terrorists is about 30%. We have thus a set of 3016 events where 
2859 involved only one nationality among the perpetrators. There are 157 events for which 
there is more than one nationality among the perpetrators. If we count as separate events the 
attacks for which the nationality of the second and the third perpetrators are different from the 
first one, this adds 174 events in the whole sample and it does not change the main results.  
We compute the number of terrorist events according to the first nationality of the 
perpetrator’s and according to the country of location of the attacks. In the main analysis, we 
use a reduced sample where the incidents with unknown nationality of the perpetrators are 
dropped in order to compare the results with the source country analysis. The correlation 
between the number of terrorist events per country of origin and per host country in this 
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reduced set of events is 0.59. In this reduced sample, 20 countries are never concerned by 
terrorist attacks, 12 countries are concerned by imported terrorist attacks but are the source of 
zero attacks and 2 countries have exported one attack but they are not concerned by terrorist 
attacks in their own territory.  
Table A1 in the appendix provides some summary statistics over the whole sample. 
For the countries concerned by terrorism, the average number of attacks per source country 
over the period 1990 to 2007 is 20.78 while it is 23.38 per host country.  
 
Source: computed from ITERATE  
 
 
Figure 7: Number of Exported Attacks vs. Number of Imported Attacks 
 
Figure 7 plots countries by the total number of exported terrorist attacks versus the 
total number of imported attacks during the period 1990 to 2007. Only the countries where at 
least five attacks where exported or imported are presented, the whole sample being plotted in 
figure A1 in the appendix. In these figures, four countries are missing, Ireland and Iran with a 
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number of exported attacks higher than 50 and United Kingdom and Germany with a number 
of imported attacks higher than 60. The countries which do not export or import any attacks 
or very few compared to the attacks perpetrated by domestic terrorists are not represented. 
They include Peru, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Chile, Indonesia, China, Liberia, Argentina, 
Guatemala and Panama. The countries close to the 45-degree line are just as likely to import 
attacks as they are to export attacks. Like in Blomberg and Rosendorff (2006), some countries 
are notable net importers of attacks. This is the case for the United Kingdom, Israel, France, 
Lebanon, the United States and Venezuela. Germany and Italy are also notable importers of 
attacks but they have many attacks perpetrated by domestic terrorists. The net exporters 
include Ireland and Iran. Colombia and Algeria are notable exporters but they host many 
attacks perpetrated by domestic terrorists.  
To check the robustness of the cross-country findings and to take into account the 
characteristics of the host and the source countries, we then perform a dyadic analysis of 
imported attacks. This analysis is performed to control for the potentially omitted variable 
problem because the export flows of terrorist attacks across countries create links between the 
counter-terrorism measures adopted in one country and the number of attacks taking place in 
other countries. In this analysis, the dependent variable is the number of imported attacks 
coming from each country of our sample over the period covered. In our original sample, 
about 40% of the events are perpetrated by a terrorist originating from a different country than 
the country where the attack occurs. We thus only have 1200 imported events over the period 
covered, which are used in the dyadic analysis, while the cross-country analysis also uses the 
events perpetrated by domestic terrorists1. 
                                                 
1 The country of location of the attack is the same as the country of origin of the perpetrator. These incidents are 
still transnational events because some of the victims are originating from another country. 
 22
Explanatory Variables 
To estimate the impact of the military approach to deter terrorism and to proxy for the 
attractiveness of the country, we focus on US overseas military interventions, using the 
average number of US soldiers2 deployed in the host country over the sample period. As 
emphasized by Pape (2006) in his analysis of the presence of American forces in Iraq and in 
the Arabian Peninsula, all the campaigns led by the terrorist organizations have the common 
goal of getting foreign military forces out of the country of origin. This point is reinforced in 
Pape and Feldman (2010). Moreover, the USA usually provide by far the largest contingent of 
soldiers so it can also be viewed as a proxy for military intervention of other countries. 
Finally, a military intervention is liable to be endogenous because it could be a response to the 
presence of highly militant groups. We control for this potential endogeneity. 
We use the standard measure of foreign aid, namely Official Development Assistance 
(ODA). This variable aggregates the disbursements of loans and grants by official agencies of 
the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to promote economic 
development and welfare in the recipient countries. This data is measured in constant 2008 
US dollars and the source is the online OECD Development Database on CRS Aid Activities. 
In the robustness checks, we also use the level of aid as a ratio to GNI from the same 
database. In our sample, 24 countries are aid donors, mainly OECD member countries. 
We use the gross enrolment rate in secondary education to measure the educational 
capital3. It is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group 
that officially corresponds to the level of secondary education. This is admittedly a fairly 
gross proxy, which we instrument below for the sake of controlling for measurement error.  
                                                 
2 The source of the active duty military personnel strengths by country is the Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports (US Department of Defence). We set the number of US soldiers in the US equal to zero 
as other institutions are in charge of fighting terrorism in the country. 
3 As in Azam and Delacroix (2006) and Azam and Thelen (2008, 2010) we are not interested in the flow of 
human capital investment, which is optimized out in these models, but in the stock of educational capital that 
determines it to some extent. Here, secondary school enrollment is just a rough proxy to capture the latter. 
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To control for other characteristics of the sample countries we use the same 
explanatory variables as in Azam and Thelen (2010). We add the average value of GDP per 
capita over the sample period to control for the level of economic development. The source of 
the data for the gross enrollment rate in secondary education and GDP per capita is the World 
Bank’s online World Development Indicators (WDI). We use the same variables for capturing 
the aspect of “militancy” in the country, the geographic and civilization characteristics and the 
level of legal capital. Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010) and Azam and Thelen (2010) show 
that the level of “ethnic tension” in the country significantly affects the level of terrorist 
attacks originating from this country. To control for the level of militancy in the country, we 
add an index of ethnic tension4 from the IRIS 3 data set (International Country Risk Guide, 
proprietary of the PRS group). To capture the level of legal capital in each country, we use the 
“Law and Order” index5 from the same data set. As suggested by Roberts (2003) the sense of 
“justice” is an important determinant of popular support for political Islamism or other radical 
positions. To capture the militancy aspect and to control for other country characteristics such 
as geography and civilization as well as for some historical determinants that may still 
influence the foreign country’s behavior, we also use several geographical dummy variables. 
These are “Camp David” (Egypt and Israel), China and India, Latin American countries, Sub-
Saharan countries, former USSR countries, ASEAN countries before 1990 and OECD 
countries before 1990. We also add two important dummy variables for capturing the 
historical importance of some past wars that are liable to influence the presence of US troops 
in these countries. This is notably the case for South Korea and the former “Axis” allies 
groups, including Germany, Italy and Japan. 
                                                 
4 The ethnic tension index is an assessment of the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, 
nationality or language divisions, ranging from -6 to 0 with higher values indicating higher ethnic tension.  
5 The law and order index represents the strength and the impartiality of the legal system and an assessment of 
popular observance of the law, ranging from 0 to 6 with higher values indicating sound and strong legal 
institutions. 
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3.2 Cross-Country Analysis 
 
From our theoretical model, we expect negative and significant impacts of the amount 
of aid received and the stock of educational capital on the number of terrorist attacks per 
country of origin of the perpetrators, in line with Azam and Thelen (2010). The impact of 
these counter-terrorism variables is different on the number of terrorist attacks hosted by each 
country as they might both affect the costs of running a terrorist organization there as well as 
to enhance the attractiveness of that venue for terrorists. We also expect that more attractive 
countries, determined in part by the presence of a high number of US soldiers in the country, 
might be more concerned by terrorist attacks. 
The two dependent variables, number of terrorist attacks per source country and per 
host country only have non-negative integer values. Hence, the standard least square 
estimation cannot be used and we present the results using a negative binomial specification. 
To control for omitted variables, we use a version of the Hausman test (Wooldridge 1997). 
The procedure has two stages: first, a reduced-form equation is estimated for each 
endogenous variable using exogenous regressors. The latter are meant to account for all the 
information that is common to the players and to the researcher. Then, the residuals resulting 
from this estimation capture the effect of the unobserved information used by the donor 
community for making their decision about aid and military intervention. These residuals are 
then included in a second step as regressors in the structural equation that we want to 
estimate. If they turn out to be jointly significant according to a Wald test then we cannot 
reject the endogeneity assumption confirming somehow that the donor is using this kind of 
unobservable relevant information for allocating its support across countries. 
Reduced-Form Equations 
For each endogenous variable we use all the exogenous variables of the structural 
equation and various additional instruments as regressors. As instrument for the educational 
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capital and for representing the development objectives of the donors, we use the under-5 
mortality rate at the beginning of the period in 1990 (WDI Online data). We also include a 
series of dummy variables to control for other country characteristics. For capturing some 
geo-strategic considerations that might also influence the presence of US soldiers in the 
country we follow Azam and Thelen (2010) and use the shortest distance to an oil-exporting 
country. We only consider countries where oil exports amount on average to more than 30% 
of merchandise export during the period 1990 to 2007. Then for each country we compute the 
distance in hundreds of kilometers between its capital-city and the capital-city of the nearest 
oil-producing country. The latter countries have thus a distance to oil wells equal to zero. 
Table 2 shows that all our reduced form equations are significant and provide an 
acceptable starting point for the subsequent analysis. Equation [1] is the reduced-form 
equation for per capita ODA. Equation [2] and [3] are OLS regressions for the level of 
secondary education and the number of US troops deployed in the country. Both are 
significant. Some economic variables such as per capita GDP and population size explain to 
some extent the need for aid but are not significant in the other two equations. The under-5 
mortality rate is clearly inversely related to past investment in human capital, especially for 
women, confirming that health and education tend to move together. It is also negatively 
correlated to the number of US troops in the country, reflecting the fact that US military 
interventions do not generally take place in the poorest countries.  
Finally, as expected, the distance to oil has a significant negative impact on the 
number of US troops deployed in the country. This variable is not significant in the other two 
equations suggesting that oil-exporting countries, holding every thing else constant, do not 
receive less aid and are not enrolling more kids at school than the other countries. The two 
dummy variables (Korea and Axis) have a strong and positive impact on the number of US 
troops deployed in the country. 
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Table 2: Reduced-Form Equations 
Variables ODA per capita Secondary School Enrol. 
Number of US 
troops (log) 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Intercept 459.188*** 93.665*** 2.538 
 (55.254) (23.722) (3.279) 
GDP p.c. -0.004*** 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population (log) -22.815*** -1.032 0.165 
 (2.835) (1.097) (0.164) 
0.037 -0.244*** -0.008** Under 5 mortality Rate in 
1990 (per 1000) (0.050) (0.040) (0.003) 
0.081 0.050 -0.025** Distance to Oil Wells 
(hundred of km) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Ethnic Tension 9.217* -0.189 -0.006 
 (5.093) (1.432) (0.154) 
Law and Order 1.888 1.476 -0.293 
 (4.929) (2.305) (0.282) 
-37.431* -8.432* 5.096*** "Axis"  
(Japan, Germany, Italy) (20.147) (4.448) (1.024) 
Korea -136.771*** 21.142*** 7.717*** 
 (21.789) (5.543) (0.794) 
ASEAN 0.377 -6.321 1.061 
 (10.348) (6.679) (0.940) 
"Camp David" 145.595** 15.461** 1.967* 
 (74.251) (6.360) (1.142) 
China and India 38.337** -6.561 0.099 
 (16.267) (6.455) (0.936) 
Latin America -1.077 -1.338 0.271 
 (14.907) (5.859) (0.631) 
OECD -49.733** 21.653*** 2.171* 
 (21.895) (5.386) (1.119) 
Sub-Saharan -13.982* -11.977 -0.681 
 (8.348) (7.265) (0.630) 
USSR -24.547*** 16.356*** -1.819*** 
 (9.280) (3.519) (0.527) 
Observations 129 129 129 
LR statistic 144.50*** 223.07*** 87.05*** 
pseudo- or adjusted R² 0.674 0.799 0.423 
Note: Equations [1] is a Tobit regression while [2] and [3] are least squares regressions estimated by maximum 
likelihood. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Structural Equations 
The first three columns of table 3 present the findings regarding the number of attacks 
per host country, while the results for the number of attacks per country of origin are 
presented in the second set of columns. In equations [5], [6], [8] and [9] we add the 
corresponding residuals from the reduced-form equations presented above to control for 
endogeneity and the relevant F-test for their joint significance. All the equations are globally 
significant. For the number of terrorist attacks per country of origin in the second set of 
columns, we get the same results as in Azam and Thelen (2010). Equation [7] does not control 
for the endogeneity. The joint-F tests are significant in equations [8] and [9], confirming the 
presence of some potential endogeneity bias.  
The amount of ODA per capita and the level of secondary education have the expected 
significant negative impacts on the number of terrorist events originating from each country. 
In equation [9], we find as in Azam and Thelen (2010) that military interventions have an 
ambiguous impact depending on the distance to oil, but it is only significant at the 10% level. 
This suggests that military interventions are only effective to counter terrorism when they 
take place far away from any oil exporting country, but that this impact is not estimated very 
precisely These results support the conclusion of the theoretical model suggesting that the 
counter-terrorism variables, foreign aid and educational capital, in the country of origin 
impact positively the cost parameter of the terrorist organization and thus decrease the 
number of terrorist attacks originating from this country.  
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Table 3: Number of Terrorist Events per Host Country and per Source Country 
Dep. Var.: Number of Attacks    
per Host Country 
Dep. Var.: Number of Attacks   
per Source Country Variables 
[4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Intercept -3.421 -1.449 -3.864 -1.671 12.448*** 8.453** 
 (2.16) (3.56) (3.34) (2.559) (4.58) (4.29) 
GDP p.c. 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Population (log) 0.466*** 0.414** 0.492*** 0.385** -0.178 -0.036 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.15) (0.13) (0.19) (0.18) 
ODA p.c. 0.007* 0.005 0.008 -0.000 -0.036*** -0.028***
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
-0.005 -0.027** -0.020* -0.003 -0.046*** -0.039***Secondary Enrollment   
(% gross) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
0.140*** 0.172* 0.232** 0.006 0.167 0.262* Nb. Of US Troops in 
the Country (log) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.11) (0.14) 
- - -0.006** - - -0.005* Interaction Nb. US 
Troopsx Dist to Oil   (0.002)  - (0.003) 
Ethnic Tension 0.165 0.147 0.072 -0.010 0.287* 0.150 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.13) 
Law and Order -0.372*** -0.282** -0.218* -0.509*** -0.366** -0.330** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) 
OECD 1.088** 1.452** 1.287** 2.135*** 2.330*** 2.122*** 
 (0.51) (0.59) (0.54) (0.74) (0.83) (0.74) 
"Camp David" 0.442 0.803 0.162 0.845* 5.757*** 4.127*** 
 (0.49) (1.25) (1.21) (0.49) (1.85) (1.59) 
Sub-Saharan -1.132** -2.137*** -1.702*** -1.121** -2.850*** -2.354***
 (0.46) (0.52) (0.51) (0.49) (0.66) (0.63) 
USSR -1.295*** -0.799 -1.063** -1.228** -0.644 -0.702 
 (0.48) (0.56) (0.54) (0.56) (0.61) (0.62) 
Endog. Bias ODA p.c. - 0.002 -0.002 - 0.042*** 0.032*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Endog. Bias Secondary - 0.037*** 0.033** - 0.059*** 0.057*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Endog. Bias US troops - -0.027 -0.037 - -0.192 -0.246* 
  (0.11) (0.11)  (0.13) (0.15) 
Observations 129 129 129 129 129 129 
Log pseudolikelihood -444.89 -441.43 -437.90 -424.29 -416.69 -414.55 
Wald statistic 182.25*** 407.57*** 163.63*** 94.86*** 120.65*** 134.03*** 
Endogeneity joint test - 7.58* 5.99 - 21.69*** 19.71*** 
Note: These equations are negative binomial regressions estimated by maximum likelihood using the ITERATE 
data set. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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The results per host country in the first set of columns are different. The amount of aid 
received per capita has no significant impact on the number of terrorist attacks per host 
country (equations [4], [5] and [6]). This suggests that two opposing effects are at work: on 
the one hand, foreign aid provides the local government with an incentive to protect the 
donor’s interests, but it also increases the attractiveness of the recipient country to the 
terrorists, on the other hand. The level of secondary education has the expected negative 
impact on the number of terrorist events per host country after controlling for measurement 
error (equations [5] and [6]). It thus seems to increase the cost of a terrorist attack in the host 
country, without increasing its attractiveness to the terrorists. The presence of foreign military 
troops has a more significant impact on the number of attacks per host country compared to 
the one on the attacks per source country. The number of US troops deployed in the host 
country thus seems to increase the level of the latter’s attractiveness in the terrorists’ eyes 
without affecting much their operating costs. To take into account the heterogeneous 
motivations of military intervention, we add an interaction term between the number of US 
troops deployed in the country and its distance to oil wells as described above. This 
interaction term excludes the oil-exporting countries and gives more weight to countries the 
further away they are from oil-producing regions. It has a significant and negative coefficient 
in equation [6], suggesting that the US troops do not attract terrorist attacks as much when 
they are positioned far enough from oil. These different impacts of military intervention 
support the idea that the presence of US soldiers in a country is an important factor of the 
country’s attractiveness for terrorists, especially in oil-exporting countries where military 
intervention might be motivated by other considerations than the war on terror. 
Taken individually, the residuals of secondary education in all the regressions are 
significant supporting the relevance of controlling for measurement errors.  The residuals of 
the reduced-form military intervention are not significant (only at the 10% level in equation 
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[9]). These results strengthen the hypothesis that the military deployment of troops is not 
always motivated by the threat of terrorism in the country. As expected, in the source 
countries’ equations, the residuals of the ODA per capita reduced-form equation are 
significant suggesting that donor countries are actively using foreign aid as a tool for fighting 
terrorism in the country of origin of the perpetrators. However, we reach a different 
conclusion per host countries suggesting that donor countries actually know that their control 
over hosted attacks is pretty low and focus on other objectives. Nevertheless, we find that the 
more relevant joint test for endogeneity is significant at the 1 % level in equations [8] and [9] 
and only at the 10 % level in equation [5] suggesting the presence of some potential 
endogeneity bias worth controlling for. 
Regarding the other control variables, per capita GDP is not significant as in Krueger 
and Maleckova (2003). However it is nevertheless a useful tool for disentangling the effect of 
foreign aid from that of under-development. Four geographical dummies are significant most 
of the time; the dummies for “Camp David” (only in the source country equations) and for 
OECD member countries have a positive and significant impact while the dummies for 
former USSR countries (sometimes) and for Sub-Saharan countries have significant and 
negative coefficients. Population is most of the time significant with a positive sign in the host 
country equations which is in line with the literature. The index of ethnic tension is most of 
the time not significant except in equation [9] with the expected positive sign but only at 10% 
level. The index of “law and order” has a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that 
it increases the operating costs of terrorists in both the source and the host countries while 
reducing their attractiveness too.  
Robustness Checks 
We have reproduced the same analysis using ODA as a ratio to GNI instead of per 
capita and we obtain roughly the same main conclusions. The results are presented in 
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appendix Table A2. The impacts of the amount of ODA received by the country as a ratio to 
GNI is significant and negative on the number of terrorist events per source country but not 
on the number of attacks per host country. Educational capital has again its negative impact, 
most of the time significant when we control for measurement errors. The presence of 
military troops in the regressions per country of origin of the perpetrators is not significant 
while for the host country the coefficient of the number of US troops deployed and the 
interaction term are significant with the same signs as in the previous analysis. These results 
support the idea that the presence of US soldiers in the host country is an important attraction 
factor and that the amount of foreign aid received by the country has a stronger impact in the 
country of origin than in the host country.  
We have also reproduced these results for the number of terrorist events per host 
country but using the whole original set of events available with ITERATE, using the events 
for which the nationality of the perpetrator is unknown. The main conclusions are unchanged 
and the results are presented in appendix Table A3.  
We have also tested a bootstrap method for estimating standard errors. The joint test 
for endogeneity is significant in some equations suggesting the importance to control for 
potential bias. The variance-covariance matrix of the structural equation estimator needs to be 
adjusted for the replacement of the unobserved information (the residuals) by their estimation. 
We have reproduced the same regressions as in table 3 using the bootstrap method and the 
results are presented in the appendix, at Table A4. Again, we have almost the same 
conclusion as for the analysis presented in Table 3. The amount of aid received and the level 
of educational capital have a significant and negative impact on the number of attacks per 
country of origin of the perpetrators while military intervention has no significant impact. The 
number of US troops deployed in the country has a positive and significant impact. The 
presence of foreign troops is an important attraction factor in the host country. Educational 
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capital also has a negative impact on the number of attacks per host country and the impact of 
foreign aid is positive but most of the time not significant. 
This cross-country analysis supports the conclusion of the theoretical model and 
suggests that the characteristics of the country of origin of the perpetrators are important 
determinants. The counter-measure variables, captured here by the level of foreign aid and the 
level of educational capital, negatively affect the number of attacks coming from that country. 
In the host country, these variables have a more diluted impact while the foreign military 
presence is an important determinant of the country’s attractiveness. 
3.3.  Dyadic Analysis of Imported Attacks 
 
In order to control for the different characteristics of the host and the source countries 
and to control for the potential omitted variable problem caused by the link between the 
measures adopted in one country and the number of attacks taking place in some other 
countries, we perform a dyadic analysis focusing on the imported attacks ( 21a  in figures 3 
through 5). For each country, we compute the total number of imported attacks coming from 
each other country over the period 1990 to 2007. From the theoretical model we first expect a 
negative impact of the operating costs of the terrorists in the country of origin, here captured 
by the source country’s level of educational capital and the amount of foreign aid that it gets. 
The impacts of the same variables in the host countries are more uncertain, depending on the 
equilibrium type. The terrorists’ operating costs in the host country exert a positive effect on 
the number of attacks imported, except in the swapping equilibrium, by reducing the number 
of home-produced attacks thus creating a vacuum that foreign terrorists will be eager to fill in. 
The attractiveness of the host country is obviously predicted to increase the number of 
imported attacks, but so is the attractiveness of the source country in the composite 
equilibrium, by providing an incentive to swap attacks. The latter effect disappears in the 
other equilibrium types. We thus also expect a positive impact of the number of US soldiers 
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deployed in the host country since this variable is an important determinant of the country’s 
attractiveness in the cross-country analysis. The results are presented pair wise in Table 4, 
which includes the same explanatory variables for the host country, in the top panel, and the 
source country, in the bottom one. All the even equations do not control for endogeneity, 
while all the odd ones do. Equations [12] and [13] are derived from [10]-[11] by adding the 
interaction term between the number of US troops in the country and the distance to oil, while 
[14]-[15] add the distance between the two countries. Regarded as a proxy for transportation 
costs, the latter may be regarded as capturing the impact of δ  in the theoretical model. Not 
surprisingly the latter variable is strongly significant with a negative sign, meaning that 
countries mainly import terrorist attacks from neighboring countries. This suggests that the 
export premium assumed above is waning when the most attractive country for terrorists is 
too far away form the source country. Inclusion of distance also entails some noticeable 
changes in the values of some other parameters and their significance.  
Among the source-countries variables, we first find some results that roughly 
reproduce those found at table 3 at equations [7] through [9], namely that foreign aid, 
educational capital, and law and order have the expected negative impacts, although ODA p.c. 
in the source country sees its significance level fall to 10% when distance is included. The 
latter also changes the significance of the population size in the source country, which 
becomes significant with a positive impact in [14]-[15]. It is probably cheaper to run a 
terrorist organization in a populous country. In this same set of variables, we also find that the 
number of US troops in the country of origin is only effective against the export of terrorist 
attacks when that country is located far enough from oil-exporting countries.  
Some fairly drastic changes occur when comparing the impacts of the host-countries 
variables in Table 4 to those of Table 3. Remember that the dependent variables are not the 
same in these two tables, as Table 3 looks at the total number of terrorist attacks hosted by 
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each country, including both home attacks and imported ones, while Table 4 only takes the 
latter into account. We only find three significant host-countries variables, all acting with a 
positive sign. We are thus unable to determine whether they mainly capture “attractiveness” 
or operating costs, which are predicted to affect the imports of attacks with the same sign, as 
mentioned above. We first find that population and GDP p.c. in the host country have a 
positive and significant impact on the number of imported attacks. Then, the most counter-
intuitive result is the strongly positive impact of foreign aid. This works in fact in the 
direction predicted by the theory, as aid is liable to enhance the attractiveness of the recipient 
country for the terrorists, may be simply by providing more targets to aim at, as well as 
providing incentives to the recipient government to invest some resources in protecting the 
donors’ interests within its sphere of influence by increasing the terrorists’ operating costs. 
Then, increased imports of terrorist attacks sanction the successful fight against home attacks. 
Moreover, foreign aid involves the presence of a number of foreign actors in the recipient 
country, which might be perceived as a threat and might increase the country’s attractiveness. 
Foreign aid is often the vector of some foreign influence on the recipient government’s 
policy-making that might affect the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated in the country, 
especially if some militant factions perceive it as a threat.  
The findings regarding the impact of the number of US troops in the host country are 
mixed. When endogeneity is not controlled for, we find a positive and significant impact. 
After controlling for endogeneity, only equation [13] shows a significant positive impact, 
which vanishes in equation [15] when controlling for distance. Similarly, the interaction term 
between the number of US troops present in the country and the distance to oil has a 
significant negative impact in [13], which disappears when distance is controlled for. 
Probably, in line with the theory, the presence of US troops in the host country is not affecting 
much its imports of terrorist attacks because it boosts the local supply of attacks, as seen 
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above, some of which being vented by increased exports, as suggested by the lower panel of 
table 4. Then imports are crowded out, despite the enhanced attractiveness due to the foreign 
military presence, by the increased number of home attacks. Similarly, the level of secondary 
education looses its significance in the dyadic imported attacks equation when distance is 
included, although it still has a negative coefficient. One potential explanation in line with the 
theory is that a higher level of educational capital in the country is affecting its level of 
attractiveness to the terrorists and their operating costs in offsetting directions, increasing the 
latter and reducing the former. 
Table A5 in the appendix presents the same analysis but using the amount of aid 
received as the ratio of GNI instead of per capita. The main difference with the results 
presented above is the impact of the number of US troops in the source country which is now 
effective irrespective of the latter’s distance to oil. In this analysis, the level of ethnic tension 
is now an important determinant. The level of ethnic tension in the host country has a positive 
and significant impact while the level of ethnic tension in the country of origin is negative and 
significant. Host country with a high level of ethnic tension may be more attractive while 
countries with a low level of ethnic tension might generate less conflict.  
 
 36
Table 4: Dyadic Analysis of Imported Attacks 
Dep. Var.: Dyadic Imported Attacks 
Variables [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
Host Country Variables: 
ODA p.c. 0.012** 0.029** 0.012*** 0.031** 0.010*** 0.030***
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
-0.019** -0.009 -0.006 -0.005 -0.018*** -0.012 Secondary Enrollment          
(% gross) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
0.199*** 0.062 0.235*** 0.117** 0.108** -0.017 Nb. Of US Troops in the 
Country (log) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
- - -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.001 Interaction Nb US Troops x 
Dist. to Oil   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Population (log) 0.396*** 0.635*** 0.428*** 0.688*** 0.507*** 0.729***
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
GDP p.c. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Law and Order 0.249 0.205 0.251 0.210 0.036 0.002 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17) 
Source Country Variables:      
ODA p.c. -0.003 -0.027*** -0.003 -0.021*** -0.001 -0.010* 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Secondary Enrollment         -0.013** -0.028** -0.015** -0.024** -0.014*** -0.026***
(% gross) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
-0.120* 0.061 -0.037 0.235* -0.048 0.167* Nb. Of US Troops in the 
Country (log) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.20) (0.04) (0.13) 
- - -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.011** -0.012** Interaction Nb. US Troops x 
Dist. to Oil   (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Law and Order -0.590*** -0.537*** -0.508*** -0.405*** -0.512*** -0.422***
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) 
Population (log) 0.307** 0.015 0.367** 0.088 0.452*** 0.310***
 (0.15) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.06) (0.11) 
GDP p.c. -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Distance - - - - -0.040*** -0.040***
(in hundred of km)     (0.01) (0.01) 
Intercept -12.69*** -11.26*** -15.03*** -14.91*** -14.35*** -16.24***
 (2.32) (3.61) (2.31) (3.61) (2.35) (2.91) 
Regional Dummies a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reduced-Form Residuals No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 16512 16512 16512 16512 16512 16512 
Log pseudolikelihood -1483.67 -1467.85 -1450.63 -1433.75 -1325.38 -1311.25 
Wald statistic 265.95*** 364.65*** 268.53*** 459.65*** 397.91*** 596.15*** 
Endog. Test - 21.28*** - 26.98*** - 28.91*** 
Note: Negative binomial regressions estimated by maximum likelihood using ITERATE. Clustered standard errors are 
in parentheses.  Significant *at 10%, **at 5%, *** at 1%.  a- for each host and source countries we have included the 
most significant regional dummies which are OECD Camp David and Sub Saharan dummies. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
This paper brings out some new facets of the delegated fight against terrorism by 
analyzing the impacts of foreign aid, educational capital, and US military presence not only 
on the production of transnational terrorist attacks as in Azam and Thelen (2010) but on their 
imports and exports as well. Terrorist organizations can perpetrate their attacks in foreign 
countries, so that the actual number of terrorist attacks taking place in any given country 
might differ from the number that is produced by the latter’s own terrorist organizations. The 
present paper first provides a game-theoretic analysis of this phenomenon, in order to bring 
out how these exports and imports of terrorist attacks may disconnect the number of terrorist 
attacks hosted by a country from its efforts to counter terrorism. This theoretical analysis 
helps us to understand the kind of cross-border externalities entailed by each country’s fight 
against terrorism.  
Two lines of empirical analysis are presented to test the relevance of this framework 
using the ITERATE data set over the 1990-2007 period. A cross-country analysis shows first 
that the determinants of the number of terrorist attacks produced by a country are different 
from those governing the number that the latter is hosting. The results confirm the 
effectiveness of foreign aid to reduce the number of terrorist attacks originating from the 
recipient country. In the host country, in contrast, the impact of foreign aid is insignificant as 
counter-terrorism measures also influence the number of imported and exported attacks. 
Foreign military interventions are counter-productive and they seem to be a strong attraction 
factor for terrorists. A strong presence of foreign actors in the recipient country or foreign 
influence on its government might in fact be counter-productive. Then, a dyadic analysis of 
the number of imported attacks in the host countries shows that foreign aid reduces 
significantly the number of attacks exported by the source country, while it attracts imported 
attacks in the host country. This finding thus brings out a potential incentive problem as the 
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benefit of the effort invested in the war on terror by the recipient government in return for the 
aid received might seem counter-productive as it is in fact punished by imported attacks from 
neighboring countries, as a response to the vacuum thus created, which are liable to produce 
some collateral damage in the host country.  
These findings thus show the importance of international policy coordination for 
fighting terrorism taking these externalities into account. Foreign aid is effective for fighting 
terrorism at the source while military intervention have a counter-productive effect. Further 
investigations are still needed to understand better how this impact of foreign aid in the host 
country affects the strategy of the donor community in the fight against terrorism. Moreover, 
further research seems worthwhile for disaggregating aid by donors, to see whether the aid 
flow given through multilateral institutions has a different impact on the attractiveness of a 
country to foreign terrorists from that of bilateral aid. Similarly, it seems promising as well to 
analyze whether imperfect fungibility between different types of grants, e.g. military aid vs. 
social expenditures, can be exploited to mitigate some of the problems brought out here. This 
shows the way to further research. 
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Appendix 
Proof of proposition 3.  
(i) In the converging equilibrium (2) allows us to write: 
 21
h
h hh sh hh
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A a a aγδ γ
⎛ ⎞= + = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
.      (A.1) 
 This can be ploughed back into (2) to yield the following equilibrium condition: 
 ( ) 2 2' h sh h h
h s
v A Aγ δ γθ γ δ γ= + .       (A.2) 
 Hence, hA  is found as the fixed point of (A.2). Taking the total differential of the latter 
and rearranging yields: 
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 Reading off the partial derivatives from this expression yields the signs described in 
proposition 3, while taking note of the fact that the other country is free of attacks. 
(ii) In the swapping equilibrium, the equilibrium conditions may be written as: 
 ( ) 2'h h s hv A Aθ δ γ= .        (A.4) 
 Hence, hA  is now found as the fixed point of (A.4). Taking the total differential of the 
latter and rearranging yields: 
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d A
v A
θ δ γ
δ γ θ
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
.     (A.5) 
 Reading off the partial derivatives from this expression yields the signs described in 
proposition 3. 
(iii) The calculations involved for the composite equilibrium are somewhat more complicated. 
First, use (4) to eliminate 21a  between the two marginal cost terms. Then, define: 
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2
1 2
2
1 2
0Z γ δ γγ δ γ= >+ .        (A.6) 
 Notice that Z  is an increasing function of all the cost parameters. Then, the first-order 
conditions (4) and (5) may be written as: 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 2'v A Z A Aθ δ= + ,       (A.7) 
and: 
 ( ) ( )2 2 1 2'v A Z A Aθ δ δ= + .       (A.8) 
 Now, define: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )21 2 1 2 1 1 2 2" " " " 0W v A v A Z v A v Aθ θ δ θ θ= − + > . Then, taking the total 
differentials of (A.7) and (A.8) and rearranging the terms yields: 
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  The partial derivatives can be read off these expressions, yielding the signs presented 
at table 1. 
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Figure A1: Nb. of Exported Attacks vs. Nb. of Imported Attacks for all the Countries 
 
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics 
  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Nb. of Attacks per Source Country 129 17.56 3 35.24 0 242 
Nb. of Attacks per Host Country 
(reduced sample) 
129 19.75 6 37.94 0 252 
Nb. of Attacks per Host Country 
(whole sample) 
129 28.59 10 50.07 0 306 
ODA per capita 129 39.42 23.51 47.73 0 265.97 
Secondary School Enrol. (% gross) 129 69.79 76.33 31.41 5.51 141.70 
Number of US Troops (log) 129 3.56 2.93 2.50 0 11.41 
Population (log) 129 16.22 16.14 1.58 12.53 20.94 
GDP per capita 129 6952.0 2035.7 9651.1 111.1 43111.3 
Ethnic Tension 129 -4.06 -4.19 1.20 -6 -0.51 
Law and Order 129 3.83 3.89 1.25 0.99 6 
Distance to Oil Reserve 129 1348.5 1081 1339.4 0 7725 
Under-5 Mortality Rate in 1990  
(per 1000) 
129 70.23 45.4 69.18 6.4 303.5 
Source: Computed from ITERATE, World Development Indicators and PRS group.
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Table A2: Number of Terrorist Events per Host Country and per Source Country using 
ODA as a ratio to GNI 
 
Dep. Var.: Number of Attacks    
per Host Country 
Dep. Var.: Number of Attacks   
per Source Country Variables 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Intercept -0.559 2.738 -4.541 -2.371 11.914** 7.904* 
 (1.97) (3.53) (3.97) (2.31) (4.64) (4.75) 
GDP p.c. -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Population (log) 0.341*** 0.249* 0.461*** 0.413*** -0.030 0.084 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) 
ODA (% of GNI) 0.007 -0.046 0.101 0.007 -0.311*** -0.230** 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.09) (0.02) (0.10) (0.10) 
-0.007 -0.041** 0.002 -0.002 -0.107*** -0.084***Secondary Enrollment 
(% gross) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
0.145*** 0.171** 0.293*** -0.009 0.087 0.159 Nb. Of US Troops in 
the Country (log) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.16) 
- - -0.007*** - - -0.003 Interaction Nb. US 
Troops x Dist to Oil    (0.003)   (0.003) 
Ethnic Tension 0.247** 0.190* 0.167 -0.045 -0.131 -0.149 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
Law and Order -0.362** -0.252* -0.240* -0.504*** -0.248* -0.238* 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) 
OECD 1.076** 1.728** 0.688 2.018*** 4.076*** 3.459*** 
 (0.54) (0.75) (0.71) (0.69) (0.96) (1.04) 
"Camp David" 1.246*** 1.855*** 0.797 0.820*** 2.804*** 2.065*** 
 (0.40) (0.70) (0.89) (0.30) (0.63) (0.79) 
Sub-Saharan -1.443*** -2.354*** -1.737*** -1.102** -2.567*** -2.227***
 (0.44) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.57) (0.58) 
USSR -1.416*** -0.664 -1.568** -1.210** 0.997 0.543 
 (0.49) (0.64) (0.64) (0.57) (0.93) (0.82) 
Endog. Bias ODA  - 0.043 -0.114 - 0.343*** 0.256** 
% of GNI  (0.09) (0.09)  (0.11) (0.11) 
Endog. Bias Secondary - 0.048** 0.009 - 0.124*** 0.103*** 
  (0.02) (0.11)  (0.03) (0.16) 
Endog. Bias US troops - -0.030 -0.074 - -0.123 -0.175 
  (0.12) (0.02)  (0.12) (0.03) 
Observations 127 127 127 127 127 127 
Log pseudolikelihood -437.03 -433.76 -429.60 -414.03 -405.87 -405.42 
Wald statistic 137.62*** 128.99*** 135.70*** 92.64*** 140.65*** 134.27*** 
Endogeneity joint test  8.41** 7.05*  22.31*** 17.32*** 
 Note: These equations are negative binomial regressions estimated by maximum likelihood using the ITERATE 
data . Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A3: Number of Terrorist Events per Host Country using the Whole Set of Events 
  
Dep. Var.: Number of Terrorist Attacks per Host 
Country (whole sample) Variables 
[7] [8] [9] 
Intercept -2.8320 -1.6544 -3.5822 
 (1.8850) (3.2772) (3.0418) 
GDP p.c. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Population (log) 0.4524*** 0.4291*** 0.4944*** 
 (0.0890) (0.1489) (0.1361) 
ODA p.c. 0.0063* 0.0061 0.0082 
 (0.0036) (0.0087) (0.0081) 
-0.0033 -0.0190* -0.0127 Secondary Enrollment          
(% gross) (0.0064) (0.0108) (0.0111) 
0.1386*** 0.1458* 0.1797** Nb. Of US Troops in the 
Country (log) (0.0389) (0.0888) (0.0859) 
- - -0.0042* Interaction Nb. US Troops x 
Dist to Oil    (0.0021) 
Ethnic Tension 0.1740 0.1587 0.0942 
 (0.1063) (0.1098) (0.0959) 
Law and Order -0.3484*** -0.2899** -0.2505** 
 (0.1312) (0.1250) (0.1204) 
OECD 0.6546 0.9557* 0.8423* 
 (0.4844) (0.5558) (0.4994) 
"Camp David" 0.3043 0.4543 -0.0983 
 (0.4847) (1.1723) (1.1102) 
Sub-Saharan -1.2667*** -1.9813*** -1.6529*** 
 (0.3901) (0.4646) (0.4763) 
USSR -1.1399*** -0.8196 -1.0368** 
 (0.4417) (0.5243) (0.4962) 
Endog. Bias ODA p.c. - 0.0005 -0.0026 
  (0.0091) (0.0083) 
Endog. Bias Secondary - 0.0255** 0.0224* 
  (0.0127) (0.0129) 
Endog. Bias US troops - 0.0000 0.0036 
  (0.1109) (0.1002) 
Observations 129 129 129 
Log pseudolikelihood -495.60 -493.71 -491.43 
Wald statistic 156.522 234.869 288.630 
Endogeneity joint test  4.06 3.20 
Note: These equations are negative binomial regressions estimated by maximum likelihood using the ITERATE 
data set. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A4: Number of Terrorist Events per Host Country and per Source Country using 
ODA per capita and bootstrap Method 
 
Dep. Var.: Number of Attacks     
per host country 
Dep. Var.: Number of Attacks   
per country of origin Variables 
[10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
Intercept -3.442 -1.446 -3.814 -1.707 12.606 8.656 
 (2.44) (5.05) (4.50) (3.41) (8.09) (7.70) 
GDP p.c. 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Population (log) 0.466*** 0.412* 0.488** 0.384** -0.187 -0.047 
 (0.12) (0.23) (0.21) (0.18) (0.37) (0.36) 
ODA p.c. 0.007* 0.005 0.008 -0.000 -0.036** -0.029* 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
-0.004 -0.027* -0.020* -0.002 -0.046** -0.039* Sec. Enrollment        
(% gross) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
0.139*** 0.172 0.232* 0.008 0.171 0.266 Nb. Of US Troops in 
the Country (log) (0.05) (0.17) (0.14) (0.09) (0.22) (0.24) 
- - -0.006* - - -0.004 Interaction Nb. US 
Troopsx Dist to Oil    (0.00)   (0.00) 
Ethnic Tension 0.162 0.145 0.072 -0.011 0.290 0.154 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.14) (0.22) (0.22) 
Law and Order -0.378** -0.289* -0.224 -0.508** -0.374* -0.338 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.26) 
OECD 1.110* 1.469* 1.304 2.180* 2.352* 2.147* 
 (0.66) (0.85) (0.80) (1.19) (1.38) (1.30) 
"Camp David" 0.443 0.812 0.176 0.851 5.814 4.187 
 (0.76) (1.79) (1.58) (1.05) (3.72) (3.58) 
Sub-Saharan -1.130** -2.125*** -1.696** -1.110* -2.837*** -2.344**
 (0.47) (0.81) (0.75) (0.57) (1.08) (1.02) 
USSR -1.326 -0.836 -1.096 -1.229 -0.630 -0.686 
 (1.12) (1.15) (1.10) (1.18) (1.33) (1.37) 
Endog. Bias ODA p.c. - 0.002 -0.002 - 0.042* 0.033* 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Endog. Bias Sec. - 0.037* 0.033* - 0.059** 0.057** 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) 
Endog. Bias US troops - -0.028 -0.038 - -0.196 -0.250 
  (0.18) (0.16)  (0.23) (0.25) 
Observations 129 129 129 129 129 129 
Nb. Replications 380 380 380 380 380 380 
Log pseudolikelihood -443.264 -431.838 -427.390 -421.795 -406.652 -404.560 
Wald statistic 87.830*** 82.084*** 90.981*** 43.258*** 44.279*** 48.463*** 
Endogeneity joint test - 3.471 2.818 - 9.376** 7.411* 
Note: These equations are negative binomial regressions estimated by maximum likelihood using the ITERATE 
data set. Bootstrap errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A5: Dyadic Analysis with ODA as a Ratio to GNI 
 
Dep. Var.: Dyadic data 
Variables [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] 
Host Country Variables: 
ODA (% of GNI) -0.026 0.084 -0.012 0.165* -0.011 0.180** 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.08) 
-0.026*** -0.010 -0.022*** 0.007 -0.026*** 0.005 Secondary Enrollment     
(% gross) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
0.153*** 0.115 0.206*** 0.221*** 0.086* 0.089 Nb. of US Troops in the 
Country (log) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) 
- - -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.000 Interaction Nb US 
Troops x Dist. to Oil   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ethnic Tension 0.163 0.205* 0.148 0.199 0.075 0.133 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) 
Population (log) 0.171* 0.290** 0.217** 0.400*** 0.331*** 0.498*** 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
GDP p.c. -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Law and Order 0.206 0.186 0.202 0.159 -0.053 -0.104 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
Source Country Variables: 
ODA (% of GNI) -0.059 -0.447*** -0.045 -0.376*** -0.049 -0.344***
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.08) 
Secondary Enrollment     -0.010** -0.102*** -0.007 -0.088*** -0.013*** -0.085***
(% gross) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) 
-0.267** -0.241** -0.171** -0.151* -0.217*** -0.213** Nb. of US Troops in the 
Country (log) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.8) (0.07) (0.07) 
- - -0.010** -0.007* -0.003 -0.001 Interaction Nb US 
Troops x Dist. to Oil   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ethnic Tension -0.239** -0.335*** -0.246*** -0.314*** -0.219*** -0.300***
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) 
Law and Order -0.512*** -0.332* -0.480*** -0.309* -0.458*** -0.307** 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.11) (0.184) 
Population (log) 0.379*** -0.090 0.417*** -0.005 0.493*** 0.150 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) 
GDP p.c. -0.000* -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.000) (0.00) 
Distance - - - - -0.043*** -0.042***
(in hundreds of km)     (0.01) (0.01) 
Intercept -9.125*** 2.378 -11.30*** -3.726 -11.17*** -5.467 
 (2.45) (4.49) (2.55) (4.12) (2.66) (3.71) 
Regional Dummies a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reduced-Form Resid. No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 16002 16002 16002 16002 16002 16002 
Log pseudolikelihood -1346.27 -1316.01 -1329.23 -1302.09 -1200.29 -1173.11 
Wald statistic 336.09*** 398.85*** 334.92*** 426.84*** 523.87*** 603.95*** 
Endog. Test - 43.32*** - 40.61*** - 43.92*** 
Note: Negative binomial regressions estimated by maximum likelihood using ITERATE. Clustered standard errors in 
parentheses.  Significant *at 10%, **at 5%, *** at 1%.  a- for each host and source countries we have included the 
most significant regional dummies which are OECD Camp David and Sub Saharan dummies. 
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